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FACTS
Christina Capacchione, a white female, was denied admission to a
magnet school in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School system (CMS).' In
1992, CMS adopted a plan to fill the available seats in the system's magnet
schools based on the race of the student applicants.2 The plan established
separate lotteries for African-American students and non-African-American
students to ensure racial balance.3 If too few students from either group
applied for admission to the magnet schools, CMS would recruit students
from the under-represented group even when students of other race wanted
to enroll.4  If CMS failed to recruit an adequate number of students
representing either race, it would leave spots designated for students of that
race unfilled.5 The school placed Christina Capacchione on a waiting list.
6
In 1997, William Capacchione, her father, brought suit against the school on
her behalf challenging the admission policy. He claimed that the school
system unconstitutionally denied her admission because of her race.7
After filing this suit, the plaintiffs in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educationa sought to reinstitute their original suit
concerning the desegregation of the system and consolidate it with the
Capacchione's lawsuit.9 The Swann plaintiffs claimed that the school
system still maintained the characteristics of a dual school system and that
the use of race in magnet school admissions racial balance.'0 The court
granted the plaintiffs motion to reopen the Swann litigation and allowed
Capacchione, and a group of white parents that were "seeking a finding that
CMS had eradicated all vestiges of past discrimination" to intervene in the
litigation." The court referred to these parties as the "plaintiff-
' Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 316 (4th Cir. 2001).
2id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 316-17.
51 d. at 317.
6id.
7 Id. at 316.
8 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 399 U.S. 926 (1970).
9 Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 317 (4th Cir. 2001).
1 Id.
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interveners.'0 2 After these white parents asked the court to declare unitary
status, 3 CMS created a remedial plan for school desegregation.
14
Prior Litigation
The first litigation involving CMS was Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education.1 5  In Swann, plaintiffs representing
African-American children of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS)
sued the school board for constitutionally inadequate desegregation efforts. 6
In a series of decisions, the district and circuit courts found that CMS's
desegregation efforts remained ineffective and that the school district
remained segregated. 7  Because the court believed that the system
intentionally delayed desegregation, the district court appointed an expert,
Dr. John A. Finger, to design a desegregation plan.' 8  Dr. Finger's plan
relied on ratios to set school enrollment, group schools, and bus students.'9
After considering a number of plans, the court favored Dr. Finger's plan.20
The circuit court affirmed this plan in part, but reversed the portion
proposing to bus young students.2'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reviewed the district
court's power to impose a desegregation plan on CMS. 22  In Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,23 the Court affirmed the district
court's plan and reviewed four areas for consideration in school
desegregation plans.24 First, the Court held that using math ratios in a
limited manner provided a legitimate measurement tool, but warned courts
not to adopt fixed ratios for each school in a district.25 Second, the Court
held that single race schools do not violate the constitution per se, but courts
must use "close scrutiny" to determine whether school assignments resulted
12
1d.
13 See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992) (not setting forth a strict definition of "unitary" status
so as not to confine the district courts); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737 (1974) (stating that a
court must declare a school system unitary when it has ended discrimination on the basis of race).
14 Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 324 (4th 2001).
" Id. at 313-14 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C.
1965)).
16 Id. at 314 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).17 1d. at 314-15.




21 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 138, 147 (4th Cir. 1970) (en banc).
2 Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 315 (4th Cir. 2001).
23 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970).24 Id. at 22.
25 Id.
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from state sponsored segregation. 26 Third, the Court stated that "pairing and
grouping of non-contiguous school zones" allowed, but did not set, rules for
the courts to follow. 27 Fourth, the Court held that busing provided a useful
tool for desegregation, if maintaining restrictions based on time and
distance.28
After the Supreme Court's affirmation of the district court's plan,
CMS requested that the district court abandon the expert's plan and adopt a
feeder plan devised by CMS. 29 The district court discarded this original
feeder plan. 30 The district court later approved a revised feeder plan that
reopened former African-American schools and prevented over-and under-
utilization of facilities.3' Two years later, the district court determined that
this plan did not work because formerly African-American schools would
return to being predominantly African-American if the plan continued.32 In
1974, the district court approved a plan designed by a citizen advocacy
group.33 The group structured the plan to avoid creating schools with an
African-Ameican majority and to allocate equally the busing burden.34
After this decision, the court removed Swann from the docket and found that
CMS was addressing the problem of a dual race school system sufficiently
through its desegregation plan.35
In 1978, a group of white parents sought to enjoin CMS from
reassigning 4,000 students to achieve racial balance within certain schools.3 6
The court rejected the challenge to the reassignment.37 In 1980, the district
court reviewed the desegregation plans in light of the growth of the African-
American student population from twenty-nine percent to forty percent.38
The court allowed CMS to operate schools with African-American student





29 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 328 F. Supp. 1346, 1347 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
30 id. at 1353.
31 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 334 F. Supp. 623, 631 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
32 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 362 F. Supp. 1223, 1229 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
33 Belk v. Chalotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 316 (4th Cir. 2001).
34 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 1102, 1103 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
35 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 67 F.R.D. 648, 650 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
36 See Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
37Id. at 1321.
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No further litigation transpired until the action brought by Mr.
Capacchione's action.4" After the trial, the district court ruled that CMS had
achieved unitary status and the raced-based enrollment policy for the magnet
schools was outside the prior desegregation orders.41 The district court
issued an injunction ending any race-based lotteries in student assignment
for the 2000-2001, as opposed to 1999-2000, school-year and awarded
Christina Cappachione nominal damages and attorney fees.42 Then, "CMS
moved to stay the injunction for the system except as it applied to the
magnet schools, until 2001-2002 school-year., 43  The Swann plaintiffs
moved for a complete stay of the injunction. 44 The district court denied both
motions.45 CMS and the Swann plaintiffs then moved for a stay, pending
appeals.46 The circuit court granted the stay of the injunction and heard the
appeal.47 First, a divided panel of the circuit vacated and remanded the
district court's order, holding that the findings were inadequate.4' The court
deemed the findings insufficient regarding student assignment, facilities and
resources, transportation, and student achievement.49 Second, the court
ruled that the magnet school maintained a permissible admissions policy
allowable under the original desegregation plan. 50 Finally, the panel vacated
the district court's injunction and award of nominal damages and attorney
fees.5' CMS and the original Swann plaintiffs appealed and the circuit voted
to review the case en banc.52
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding that CMS ended the dual school system and
achieved unitary status by eliminating all traces of any prior discriminatory
practices.53 The court further noted that full control of the system should be
40 id.
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returned to the local authorities.54 The court separately reversed the district
court's finding that the use of race in deciding enrollment at the magnet
schools was unconstitutional.55
ANALYSIS
First, the court reviewed the district court's ruling on unitary status
for clear error.56 The court applied the standard it set forth in Faulconer v.
Commissioner.57 Under the Faulconer standard, the reviewing court must
have a "definite and firm conviction" that the original court made a
mistake. 58 The court further elaborated on this standard by referencing the
Supreme Court's statement in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City.s9 In that
case, the Court stated that to find clear error there cannot be alternate
interpretations of the evidence.60 The court of appeals should uphold the
district court's ruling if based on a permissible view of evidence. 6'
Next, the court stated that the Supreme Court had not presented a
fixed definition for the meaning of "unitary" in the context of the school
systems. However, the Court had held that a school system is unitary when
it does not discriminate on the basis of race and purposeful dual school
system no longer exists.63 Therefore, the party that asks the court to end its
supervision has the burden of proof. 4
The court stated that to determine the unitary nature of a school
system, the court must decide whether the system has made a good faith
effort to comply with the court order of desegregation and whether, within
practical limits, the school system has removed remnants of historical
discrimination.65 Various factors determine whether a school system has
achieved unitary status and can resume local control.66 Such factors include
student assignment, faculty assignment, facilities and resources,
54 id.
55 id.56 id. at 317.
57 Id. at 318 (citing Faulconer v. Comm'r, 748 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir. 1984)).
58 Id. (quoting Faulconer v. Comm'r, 748 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir. 1984).
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transportation, staff assignment, and extracurricular activities.67 The court
addressed these factors in order.
The court stated that student assignment is the most important of all
factors used to determine unitary status because the separation of students
based on race is the core of the dual system.6' The court upheld the district
court's use of a fifteen percent variance in a school's African-American
student ratio to the district average to detect the presence of discrimination.
69
In Swann, the district court approved a plus-fifteen percent variance and the
Supreme Court upheld the limited use of ratios.
70
The court approved also the district court's finding that, within
CMS, sixteen percent of schools had African-American student bodies with
greater than fifteen percent variance for more than three years and thirteen
percent had a less than fifteen percent variance for more than three years.7'
The court also accepted the district court's finding that CMS scored well on
two desegregation measures; the first measured the variance of each school's
student population from the district's overall population, and the second
measured the amount of interracial exposure available to students at the
school.72
The court accepted the district court's rejection of the Swann
plaintiffs' and CMS's claim about an increase in racial imbalance in recent
73years. The court accepted the argument that two demographic changes, a
growth in the percentage of African-American students, and a shift in the
white population to the southern portion of the county, precipitated the
increase in racial imbalance.74 The court stated racial imbalance does not
provide conclusive proof of discrimination.75 Overall, the court approved of
the finding that the school system's near perfect compliance with the
prescribed ratios had no connection with de jure discrimination. 76 Further,
the court noted the school board had no duty to resolve racial imbalances
that result from demographic shifts.77
67 id.
6 1Id. at 319.
69 Id.
70 id.
7 1 Id. at 319-20.
72 Id. at 320.
73 Id.
74 Id.
751 Id. at 321.
76 Id. at 322.
77Id. at 321.
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Next, the court addressed the Swann plaintiffs' contention that the
increased school discrimination occurred because of the schools system's
decisions in school siting, transportation, and school transfers.7" The
plaintiffs based their argument on a prior case in the long history of CMS
discrimination, Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.79 In
that case, parents sought to enjoin CMS from assigning students to schools
for racial balance purposes. 80  The court upheld CMS's reassignment81
Here, however, the court rejected the Swann plaintiffs' argument for three
reasons: Martin was not a unitary status case, the appellate court must defer
to the district court's ability to interpreting its own cases, and the shift in the
Supreme Court's desegregation jurisprudence did not support their
82contention.
The court of appeals reviewed the facts and accepted the district
court's finding that the school system's school siting contained no evidence
of discriminatory policy.83 Confronted with a massive population growth
and shifting demographics, the school board continued to consider the racial
balance of its schools.8 4 The court also accepted the trial court's findings
that traffic patterns, growth, and housing patterns accounted for the
disproportionate burden of student busing, and that the school system
adequately accounted student transfers.85
The court closely examined the district court's findings regarding
any differences in facilities and resources among schools.86 First, the court
agreed with the Swann plaintiffs contention that the district court improperly
placed the burden of proof regarding this issue on CMS and the Swann
plaintiffs.87  Nevertheless, this amounted to only harmless error.88  The
evidence proved the absence of discrimination in the facilities, regardless of
where the burden of proof fell. The court found that the issue should not be
remanded.89 Second, the district court did not find any discrepancies
between racially imbalanced schools and white schools that needed to be
78 Id. at 323.
79%d (citing Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D.N.C. 1979)).
so Id,Iod.
82 Id. at 324.
I ld. at 324-26.
84 Id. at 325.
8 Id at 326.
86 Id. at 326-29.
87 Id. at 326-27.
88 Id. at 327.
89/d.
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replaced. 90 Third, although CMS's policy to renovate old schools under a
different building standard disproportionately affected African-Americans, it
was not proof of discrimination. 9' This policy applied to all old schools
regardless of student body but African-American inner-city schools tended
to be older.92
The court upheld the lower court's determinations that no evidence
of discrimination by the school system with regard to faculty assignment,
transportation, staff assignment, and extracurricular activities was present.9
The court considered three ancillary factors that tend to show a non-unitary
school system: teacher quality, student achievement, and student
discipline.94 The court accepted the district court's conclusion that there
was no material difference among schools regarding the quality of the
teachers. 95 Although teachers in imbalanced African-American schools had
less experience, the court noted that experience "does not necessarily
correlate to competency. 96  Despite the gap in achievement between
African-American and white students, the court attributed the disparity to
socioeconomic factors rather than discrimination. 97 The court also found
that all schools held students to the same disciplinary standards.9"
The court upheld the district court's ruling that CMS acted in good
faith, finding that the desegregation plan had become institutionalized
throughout the school system.99 In doing so, it noted the district court's
finding that seven factors supported the conclusion of CMS's good faith: (1)
no parties had sought further relief after the case was removed from the
docket; (2) CMS had gone "above and beyond" the court orders to eliminate
racial imbalance; (3) the board had been open to and sought community
input to its desegregation plans; (4) the board had repeatedly announced its
commitment to desegregation; (5) African-Americans accounted for four of
the nine seats on the school board; (6) the board's actions over the preceding
thirty years did not suggest discrimination, and (7) there was no evidence
that the school board was "guilty of easily correctable errors."'
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 327-28.
93 Id. at 326, 329-30.
94 Id. at 330-33.
9' Id. at 330.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 331.
981 d. at 332.
99 
Id. at 333.
'0o Id. at 332.
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Next, the court considered the district court's rejection of CMS's
remedial plan for student assignments.'0 1 The Swann plaintiffs and CMS
claimed that the out of hand rejection of the plan was an error in law and
amounts to a reversal of unitary status determination. 0 2 The two parties
claimed that the district court must consider both what a school district has
done and what it may do in the future.'0 3 The district court's failure to
consider the latter prong of the test prompted the Swann plaintiffs to assert
that the court of appeals should reverse the district court's order.' 4 The
basis for this contention rested in Board of Education v. Dowell.'0 5 Dowel!
directed federal courts to consider "whether the Board has complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the
vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent
practicable.' 0 6 The court ruled that the second prong did not require the
district court to examine the remedial plan drafted after the start of litigation,
but noted that the district court did address whether historical discrimination
had been alleviated to the extent possible.
10 7
The court then addressed the district court's refusal to consider the
remedial plan in light of Federal Rule of Evidence 402.'08 FRE 402 allows
for the admissibility of relevant evidence except as prohibited by the
Constitution, Acts of Congress, and other evidence rules.t 9 The court
determined that the remedial plan mostly did not offer any additional
evidence otherwise not admitted and therefore had low probative value." 0
The court found its exclusion was harmless to the extent the remedial plan
contained unique and relevant evidence."'
The court was closely split on whether it should consider the use of
race to admit students to magnet schools as a constitutional violation of the
non-African American students' rights. A 6-5 majority reversed the district
court's ruling that the use of race was outside the scope of CMS's power
101 Id.12 id.
10 3 id.
'o4 Id. at 334.
'05 Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
106 Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 334 (4th Cir. 2001).
107 Id. at 334-35.
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under the desegregation plan." 2 However, the majority wrote two opinions,
one in which two judges joined 3 and the other in which four j oined.1
1 4
The first opinion stated that the magnet school plan would be
unconstitutional if it were enacted today because of changes in the Fourth
Circuit's jurisprudence." 5  The court has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects all citizens regardless of race and therefore reverse
discrimination practices are unconstitutional.' 6 The court noted that the
question for the court to consider, however, is whether CMS was acting
properly under the desegregation plan and the courts' rulings." 7 This first
opinion stated that CMS's use of strict ratios was reasonable considering the
judicial opinions that had preceded its implementation of the magnet school
program.'" The court cited three prior decisions in the long line of cases
involving CMS that suggested that the use of strict ratios was
constitutional." 9 The opinion concluded that to find CMS had acted
unconstitutionally in setting up the magnet schools would ask them to ignore
the prior opinions of the courts. 20
The court recognized that the prior desegregation plans supported
the school board's admission policies for the magnet schools. 2 ' In Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,'22 the district court ordered
CMS to "maintain the racial makeup of each school."' 23 If the prior court
orders were incorrect, the proper course is to remedy it through the judicial
process and not to expect the school district to adapt the order as it deems
necessary. 124
The second opinion provided more detail in reversing the district
court's holding that the magnet school program was unconstitutional.
25
First, the judge writing the opinion stated that CMS was not considered a




113 Id. at 353-55.
14 Id. at 397-412.
"
5 Id. at 353.
16 Id. (citing Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F3d. 698 (4th Cir. 1999); Eisenberg v.
Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999)).
117 id.
"
8 Id. at 353-54.1191d"
12Old. at 354.
121 Id.
22 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
123 Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 354 (4th Cir. 2001).
124 Id. at 355.
12- Id. at 397-98.
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acted under the court's desegregation orders. 126 The opinion noted that the
plaintiffs seeking an injunction against the magnet schools' enrollment
program argued the following three points: the plan was separate from the
court ordered desegregation plan; the race conscious enrollment disobeyed
the desegregation plan; and if the enrollment plan were in compliance with
the court orders, the district court should review it under strict scrutiny.
27
The district court rejected the first and third argument but found the second
one persuasive.
28
The second plurality opinion stated that the district court made two
errors in its conclusion concerning the magnet schools.' 29 First, the district
court ignored the general protection that school boards maintain while acting
under court desegregation orders.130 The opinion cited the Supreme Court's
opinions stating that parties subject to injunctions must follow these
injunctions even if there are grounds to object to the order' 3' or the court
later sets aside the injunction. 132 Further, the court cited two Supreme Court
opinions holding that school boards specifically must follow court orders for
desegregation until the court relieves them of the order, regardless of other
considerations. 133
The district court also failed to recognize the broad and expansive
nature of the court orders under which the board operating. Thus, CMS's
magnet school served as a good faith effort to comply with court orders and
comply with the constitution. '34 The opinion quoted from the prior cases in
this litigation. Echoing the first opinion that reversed the district court, the
second opinion quoted previous Swann decisions in which the court
generally permitted the desegregation plan. 3  Further, CMS's race
conscious enrollment plan for magnet schools provided an appropriate
means toward realizing court ordered desegregation. 36 The opinion pointed
out that to be practicable, any attempt to desegregate must contain some
126 id.
1271 d. at 398.
121 Id. at 398-99.






131 Id. at 401-02.
136 Id. at 402.
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reference to ratios.37 While the courts may not set the ratios for students of
each race, school board has to power to use ratios.
138
CONCLUSION
In Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the court
decided two important issues. First, the court determined whether CMS had
achieved unitary status with regard to race. Second, the court found that the
use of race in determining magnet school enrollment was constitutional.
With regard to the first issue, the court upheld the findings of fact at the
district court level. The court based its determination on the current and
historical student ratios within the schools and the lack of any evidence
showing the school board had acted in any manner contrary to the
desegregation order. Most significantly, the court ruled that the trial court
does not have to consider a remedial plan the school board developed after
the initiation of the litigation. Federal courts supervision of school systems
should not continue until it is impossible to further desegregate the system
but should continue until desegregation has been eliminated to an extent
practicable. This holding and repeated statements by the court emphasize
the federal courts' inclination to return the control of school systems to local
authorities.
A commentator studying the East Baton Rouge desegregation
litigation reached a similar conclusion in reviewing recent federal circuit
court decisions. 39 Speaking generally, the writer stated that "[t]he courts
seem more willing to compromise policies of desegregation in order to
return school systems to local control."' 40  With regard to CMS, this
statement seems to be too strong. The court of appeals is deferential to the
lower court and this deference seems to reflect an unwillingness to scour the
facts to find desegregation more than a "compromise" of desegregation
policies. In fact, the federal courts have closed desegregation cases in cities
in all parts of the country. 4 ' The CMS decision serves as a continuation of
this trend.
The reversal of the district court's ruling on the magnet school
program is based on two opinions. Both opinions agree that the court should
137 Id. at 403-05.
' Id. at 404-06.
139 Jessica Watson, Quest for Unitary Status: The East Baton Rouge Parish School Desegregation Case,
62 LA. L. REV. 953, 972 (2002).
140 Id.
141 Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 N.W. L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2000).
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not find constitutional violations by CMS when it acts in a manner
consistent with opinions of courts in prior litigation. Parties acting under a
court order cannot be held to violate the Constitution because they are bound
to follow the order first. Non-African Americans could have sought to
revise the original court orders involving desegregation.
These opinions offer a degree of stability and determinability to the
affected school districts. These districts do not, and should not, have to
continually adjust their desegregation plans to conform to changes in the
federal appellate court's jurisprudence. That contemplation is outside of the
expertise of school districts. Also, this plan removes the possibility of
mistake on the part of the school district. A school district may misinterpret
a court opinion or prematurely bring an end to its actions to remedy school
discrimination. The better method is to require affected parties to challenge
the original court order.
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Richard McCarthy
2003]

